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INTRODUCTION 
Social capital can lead to negative externalities as well as positive externalities. At this point it 
is important that what individuals and societies understand from social capital. It is often 
difficult to bring together social interests with individual interests. In this case, social capital 
plays a balancing role between the market and society. On the other hand, when social capital 
is transformed into a tool used for the interests of certain groups, it can produce unfavorable 
results for society. Especially the forms of social capital formed by only strong ties or by only 
weak ties limit the possible positive effects of social capital. In this case, social capital can fail 
like state and market. In this study, firstly the meaning of social capital concept is explained. 
At the same time, the positive and negative effects on society of social capital are theoretically 
stated. The negative externalities of social capital are explained as social capital failure. In this 
context, exclusive effect of social capital and pressure and interest groups, criminal 
organizations, corruption and nepotism-chronyism are explained as social capital failure. 
1. The Concept of Social Capital  
There are many types of capital in the economic literature. Economic capital, physical capital, 
human capital and social capital are some of these. Social capital is separated from other types 
of capital due to certain characteristics. In other types of capital, people can get capital without 
need for other people. On the other hand, it is not possible for social capital to form by itself. 
At this point, the quantity and quality of people’s relationships with other people is important. 
Especially with the 1990s, the topic of social capital has become popular again. Many 
researchers, such as Bourdieu, Coleman, Fukuyama and Putnam, have studied social capital. 
Primarily Pierre Bourdieu (1985) who defined the concept of social capital1 as “the aggregate 
of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more 
or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Portes, 1998: 3). 
On the other hand Coleman (1988) broadly defined social capital as “people’s ability to 
cooperate in common goals in groups and organizations. This ability depends on the extent of 
shared norms and values in different communities and whether they are able to subordinate 
individual interests to larger groups interests” (Graeff and Swendsen, 2012: 2830). Another 
definition of social capital belongs to Francis Fukuyama. According to Fukuyama social capital 
is as the existence of a certain set of informal values or norms shared among members of a 
group that permits cooperation among them (Fukuyama, 1997: 378). The definition of social 
capital made by Putnam is similar to that of Fukuyama. According to Putnam “social capital 
refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve 
the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993: 167). 
Given the definitions of social capital, social capital has many characteristics that distinguish 
it from other types of capital. For instance unlike other capitals, social capital emerges in the 
context of the relations between actors. Social capital is defined by its function.  A variety of 
diverse entities that share two elements, not a single entity: they are all part of social structures 
and facilitate certain actions of actors of individuals or institutional actors within the social 
structure. Hence, like other forms of capital, social capital can be productive, leading to some 
consequences that may not be possible in its absence. Like physical capital and human capital, 
social capital can not be completely changed, but it can be specific to certain activities. At this 
point, a form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or 
harmful to others (Coleman, 1988: 97, 98) 
Bourdieu and Coleman also argue that social capital has a property that is not material 
according to other forms. As economic capital forms in bank accounts, social capital emerges 
as a result of human relations. In order to have social capital, one person has to associate with 
others (Portes, 1998: 7). At this point, social capital can be considered as a subset of human 
capital. Because social capital is a property of groups, not individuals. A group with social 
capital can be as small as two friends who share or collaborate on a common project, or at the 
                                                        
1 The words social capital were firstly used by Hanifan in 1916,  as the “goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social 
intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit.” (Stern, 2013: 823; Hanifan, 1916 ).  
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same time as a whole nation (Fukuyama, 1997: 380). Social capital can be formed around close 
family and relatives with strong ties, as well as from weak ties with different cultures. 
The most important condition for the formation of social capital is to have social networks. 
Putnam states that in the places where trust and social networks develop, individuals, 
companies, neighborhoods, and even nations will develop that the social capital of a country 
will be formed in this way (Knudsen et al., 2014: 6). At this point according to Lin (2001) social 
capital as “resources embedded in one’s network or associations ...accessible through direct 
and indirect ties”. On the other hand there are some differences Szreter and Woolcock’s (2004) 
distinction of bonding, bridging and linking social capital. This definitions include the outcome 
of accessing resources as well as the process of participation and access to social resources for 
expected income or “purposeful action” (Hawkins and Maurer, 2012: 356, 357). In the 
following figure is related to the process from social networks to social capital. 
Figure 1: From Social Network/Support to Social Capital 
 
Source: Hawkins R. L. and Maurer, K. (2012) ‘Unravelling Social Capital: Disentangling a Concept for Social Work’ British 
Journal of Social Work 42, p. 356 
As can be seen from the above, social networks create new links between people in the social 
structure in the direction of mutual trust and commitment. At this point, the bonds among 
people have been named by different researchers. For instance the bilateral distinction of weak 
ties and strong ties made by Granovetter in 1973 was later categorized as Putnam’s 
binding/bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to homogeneous 
networks among people who are similar to each other. In this type of capital, identities are 
emphasized as well as trust and intense reciprocity. Bridging social capital that bridges is the 
relationship between different people and disseminating information. To this distinction of 
Putnam, Woolcock has incorporated the concept of linking social capital, which expresses the 
relationship between people and groups at different social classes or levels of power (Ruben 
and Heras, 2012: 467; Woolcock and Narayan, 2010: 289).  
Especially in the 1990s, social capital emerged as a simplified “treatment” of social science 
against structural economic, racial, ethnic, gender and geographical differences. Social capital 
theorists say that when social ties are established, life is good and that these connections can 
turn bad in time. Some studies indicate that strong ties, high levels of trust in networks and 
reciprocity are useful in the formation of social capital. For example, a low-income network 
may show a high level of trust, obligation, and reciprocity, helping them to survive. At the same 
time, due to reasons such as low social and economic status, the resources of this group do not 
improve the life chance of the group members and in some cases can decrease the quality of 
life. In other words, the benefits of a well-intentioned social capital can be reduced in time 
(Hawkins and Maurer, 2012: 356, 357). Therefore the sharing of values and norms among 
people may not produce social capital alone. Because values and norms may have been 
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erroneously constructed from the beginning. For this reason, the structure of social capital has 
its own positive and negative features (Fukuyama, 1997: 378) 
1.1. Positive or Negative Effects of Social Capital  
Social capital can reveal positive or negative externalities due to its particular characteristics. 
Partha Dasgupta has stated that social capital is a private good that produces a wide range of 
positive and negative externalities. 2At this point, social capital in a particular group or network 
can reveal positive externalities by teaching social virtues such as honesty and credibility to 
people. On the other side, “intra-group” tends to show solidarity and exclude people who are 
out of the group. Therefore, many groups or networks are tightly connected may be fragmented 
and, as a whole, conflicts and hostilities may arise (Fukuyama, 2002: 30). 
Theoreticians conducting research on social capital emphasize that there may be positive and 
negative social effects in each country that can promote social welfare or harm social order. At 
this point, while corruption is an example to negative social capital, the high level of general 
confidence in society can set an example for positive social capital. Especially when corruption 
is measured at the macro level, it reflects the behavior of government institutions as political 
and economic actors, and at the same time reflects how actors prefer certain norms and intend 
to spend universal ones. The negative social capital in this form can be said to be an effect of a 
harmful effect on the wealth of a nation (Graeff and Swendsen, 2012: 2830). 
As most critics of social capital have observed, the effects may be as negative or positive. For 
example, the Mafia, the Ku Klux Clan, ethnicity exploitation and the exclusion of ethnic groups, 
etc. On the other hand, the horizons of social capital are much bigger; because nobody has 
claimed that the family or neighborhood is a rent seeking or corruption nest. Therefore social 
capital is a resource and can be used for good or bad as other sources (Fine and Lapavitsas, 
2004: 27). The following figure shows that actual and potential gains and losses in the 
















                                                        
2 Other types of capital, such as social capital, can also reveal negative externalities. Physical capital and human capital can also 
produce negative externalities. For example; physical capital, assault rifles, toxic wastes, and other social evils. It can also be used 
to make human capital bombs embodied in a chemical grade. However, as a whole, social capital has the capacity to produce more 
externality than the other capital forms. Moreover, these externalities often disrupt the social capital that makes up these 
(Fukuyama, 2002: 30). 
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Figure 2: Actual and Potential Gains and Losses in Transactions Mediated by Social 
Capital 
 
Source: Portes, A. (1998) ‘Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24, 
p.8 
As seen above, it is possible for social networking and other social networks to have positive 
and negative consequences to achieve certain benefits. From a positive point of view, the 
formation of social capital within certain groups facilitates social control within the 
community, especially the formation of strong ties enhances family support and benefits from 
network membership. On the other hand, from a negative point of view, social capital is limited 
within a certain group, making it difficult to reach new opportunities and innovations and thus 
limiting individual freedoms. At this point, as the group belongs to the forefront, the trust 
among the other groups decreases and this leads to a decrease in the general confidence in the 
society. On the other hand, lowering the norm level causes weakening of external control, 
which can lead to wrong behavior. 
On the other hand at the point of application of state policy, there are positive and negative 
roles of social capital.  It is believed that social capital has a positive correlation with 
educational levels, the public supports open access to education and supports credit for the 
poor. This effect of social capital is important; because higher educational levels often lead to 
the formation of more dense networks of social capital. In this case, social capital is 
transformed into a structure that produces positive externalities as a result of social 
interactions. Such positive externalities increase the knowledge associated with human 
behavior, which weakens the potential for opportunistic behavior. However, these externalities 
can lead to coordination problems and free-rider problems resulting in malfunctions when 
information is limited (Akçomak, 2008: 86). For this reason, the characteristics of the social 
capital producing positive and negative externalities should be well known. 
1.2. Positive Social Capital  
In order to social capital to create positive externalities, there must be a balance between 
individual and collective goals, as well as social interaction and cognitive awareness based on 
knowledge as well. If these conditions do not occur, positive social capital will become a 
negative social capital. 
In the broadest sense, positive social capital is defined as the ability of people to cooperate. At 
this point, unlike the compulsory co-operation imposed by an official institution, there is a co-
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operation that takes place as a result of informal norms3 (Graeff and Swendsen, 2012: 2831). 
On the other hand the social capital definition by Lin also emphasizes the positive 
characteristics of social capital. According to Lin (2001) social capital is “resources embedded 
in social networks and accessed and used by actors for actions”. Therefore, social capital has 
important components. First of all, social capital represents the resources embedded in the 
social relations of the individual and provides access to such resources with the actors in the 
social network. Such characteristics of social capital indicate that social capital produces 
positive externalities for a group of people. At the same time, such positive externalities are 
achieved through shared trust, norms and values, and consequently on expectations and 
behaviors. The trust, norms and values shared at this point emerge from social networks and 
informal forms of organizations based on associations (Durlauf and Fachamps, 2005: 1644). 
The fact that social capital creates positive externalities according to the types of use of social 
capital. At this point, Gitell and Vidal (1998), Szreter and Woolcock (2004) point out that there 
are three different types of social capital: bonding/binding, bridging and linking. Bonding 
social capital emerges after a close family relationship. Bridging social capital emerges in 
relationships between people and groups that differ in terms of age, socio-economic status, 
race/ethnicity, etc. Linking social capital is a relatively strong force on individuals and 
communities themselves is a consequence of the changes that have arisen from relations with 
the ownership institutions and people. All of these levels can lead to different outcomes 
depending on the relative socio-economic condition and strength of the population. Ideally, 
individuals and societies must have social capital and productive outcomes in all three levels 
(Hawkins and Maurer, 2012: 358, 359).  
Bonding social capital has two important tasks at the point of creating positive externalities. 
At this point, it provides emotional, cognitive and economic support to family and friends 
group members. This support emerges after a process of socialization in which common values 
are created. At the same time bonding social capital is facilitate social control. This control is 
achieved through informal norms, respect and moral constraints in society. On the other hand, 
bridging social capital facilitates access to different information and innovations, sometimes 
with innate abilities, and sometimes with intense cognitive interactions between people, 
making people connect with distant people (Menes and Donato, 2013: 3, 4). In the folllowing 
figure a simplified model is shown by Lin (2001) at the point where social capital creates 
positive externalities. 
Figure 3: A Simplified Model of Social Capital 
 
Source: Durlauf S. N. and Fafchamps M. (2005) Social Capital, Handbook of Economic Growth, Chapter 26, Volume 1B. Edited 
by Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, Elsevier B.V. DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01026-9 p.1644. 
                                                        
3 The innovative and intuitive power of social capital comes from two sources. First of all, social capital draws attention to the 
positive results of sociability. At this point social capital is not found in bank accounts like economic capital and it is formed as a 
result of social relations. Therefore, the social capital’s application of uneconomic methods to solve economic problems and the 
adoption of a multidisciplinary approach draws attention to policy makers seeking less costly, less economical solutions to social 
problems (Portes, 1998: 2, 3). 
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As can be seen from the above, the positive power of social capital emerges after the 
interactions and links established within social networks. At this point, the diversity and 
extension of the resources are important contributors to the formation of social capital. In 
particular, bridging social capital can produce positive results in terms of economic prosperity. 
Granovetter (1985) explains this feature of bridging social capital with the power theory of 
weak ties. 
According to the theory of weak ties theorized by Granovetter (1985), individuals combine or 
join networks that are somewhat dissimilar or heterogeneous in some way. Especially 
obligation and reciprocity among members, which increases the amount of effort are required 
for mutual interaction. However, the difference means more changes in the value of network 
resources; which may lead to the production of a higher value social capital. For example, in 
the United States, social work specialists play a variety of roles, including academic guidance 
to families at economic and social risk. At this point, social workers can help a student in a low-
income community get a college scholarship from a high-income community. Through 
bridging social capital, students from different income groups can be connected to networks of 
the same kind. In general, bridging social capital can make it easier for students to reach new 
opportunities in terms of job opportunities through their graduate network after they graduate 
(Hawkins and Maurer, 2012: 360, 361).  
At the same time, Putnam (1993, 2000) stated that positive social capital is created through 
voluntary organizations. When people voluntarily come together in groups, the “face to face” 
interaction creates a certain trust. Putnam (2000) concluded that in the comparison of 
Northern and Southern Italy, the density of voluntary organizations was higher in northern 
Italy than in the South. Especially in southern Italy, social capital is lower than in northern 
Italy, as the hierarchy of state is strong and rigid (Graeff and Swendsen, 2012: 2831).  
1.3. Social Capital Failure: Negative Social Capital 
Social capital is primarily a bridge and has complementary task between the state, society and 
the markets in the discovery of traditional values that are lost in modern society. If there is no 
positive interaction, it is always possible for social capital to create negative externalities.  At 
the same time, the absence of an inclusive approach to social capital is one of the important 
factors that reveal the social capital failure. 4 
Social capital failures may arise from the misuse of social capital as well as market and state 
failures. Especially the property of social capital as a public property reveals that individuals 
can misuse it and therefore the possibility of social capital failure. As Alejandro Portes says, 
sociality is a sharp knife on both sides (Field, 2008: 102). The nature of social capital is one of 
the main factors that lead to the positive or negative effects of social capital on individuals and 
society. Social capital, like the markets and states, can also fail (Edelman et al., 2002: 13; 
Bowles, 1999: 7, 8). Especially negative effects of social capital exist, for instance when social 
networks begin to create inertia between partners due to a locking in of past expectations and 
aims (Turner, 2011: 10). 
Alejandro Portes (1998) insisted that the negative effects of social capital should also be taken 
into consideration in the literature. Portes emphasizes that links that benefit members of a 
group often prohibit access to others (Breuskin, 2012: 3). For example, while group members 
may benefit from common sources, foreign persons may be excluded and others may be 
excluded by creating an environment of general insecurity under certain circumstances 
(Andriani, 2013: 18). At this point only the people in the network are dependent on social trust; 
whereas there is distrust about strangers. So the question that needs to be asked here is does 
social capital cover most of the society? How many networks overlap so that all social divisions 
and communities are interrelated? (Breuskin, 2012: 3). On the other hand, the negative aspects 
of social capital are expressed by Portes. These can be expressed as; exclusion of individuals 
                                                        
4 Social capital failures or negative effects of social capital are expressed in some sources, negative externalities of social capital or 
the dark side of social capital (Source: Portes, 1998, Stern, 2013). In this study negative externalities emerging from social capital 
are expressed as social capital failure. 
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from the network, extreme demands and freedoms of network members, restrictions on 
individual freedoms, downward norms, claims of extreme group members (Portes, 1998: 15).  
1.3.1. Types of Social Capital Failure 
Social capital is a concept that can be obtained by a group of people and can be achieved as a 
result of cooperation between people. This inevitably shows that social capital is a public good. 
Therefore, social capital can be a public good, which can lead to situations such as the tragedy 
of common goods. For example, when social capital is used within individual’s own interests 
and objectives can reveal some exclusionary effects.  The types of social capital failure can be 
expressed as exclusion effect, crime organizations, pressure and interest groups, corruption, 
nepotism and chronyism.  
1.3.1.1. Social Capital and Exclusion Effect 
The exclusion effect is a social capital failure that occurs in intra-group and intergroup 
outcomes. At this point, many people may want to become members of a group of strong and 
/ or weak ties. At the same time, people may want to feel privileged from other groups (Bowles, 
1999: 7, 8). Alejandro Portes (1998) suggests that there are genuine links that benefit members 
of a group, often preventing others from accessing the group. At this point, though there is a 
high level of social trust among the people on the network, there will be a distrust of things 
outside the network. Social capital can lead to a number of problems that do not cover the vast 
segment of society. Therefore it also interrupts the social division that overlaps with each other 
and interacts with networks (Breuskin, 2012: 3). 
In particular, the tendency of societies to be relatively homogeneous can reduce the benefits of 
economic diversity associated with different complementary abilities. At the same time, the 
vision of homogeneity of groups can be restricted 5 (Bowles, 1999: 7). Hence, group solidarity 
is often used for enmity against non-group individuals. Fukuyama explains the negative 
consequences of social capital with the idea of a radius of trust. When the radius of trust goes 
beyond the group membership, the results are more positive and the negative results are more 
likely to occur in the region where the trust group is limited to members (Field, 2008: 104). At 
the same time, the dominance of feelings of belonging can lead to ignorance of the bad behavior 
of many. At this point the problem is getting worse with group homogeneity, which is caused 
by neighborhood relations. Intra-group and non-group distinctions can lead to moral 
consequences in matters such as race, religion, nationality or gender. With this narrow vision, 
the possibility of promoting ethnic hostility is increasing. In this case, the failure of social 
capital can lead to worse outcomes than market and state failures, and the wealth and power 
of group content can lead to the exploitation of foreigners (Bowles, 1999: 7, 8; Bowles and 
Gintis, 2001: 12). 
In some societies in particular, the high level of bonding social capital within the group 
diminishes the ability of group members to cooperate with strangers and creates negative 
externalities on these groups (Harris, 2007: 2, 3). Portes and Landolt (1996) believe that the 
domination of certain industries in the United States by certain ethnic groups creates great 
difficulties for those who attempt to enter this industry. An example of an Italian construction 
company is the example of Italian, Irish or Polish immigrants having difficulties in winning 
contracts because their grandchildren dominate the industry and newcomers to the industry, 
such as African American contractors, are not part of the social network (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2002: 8). At this point, Putnam (2000) suggests that bonding social capital can 
affect economic gain negatively. In particular, the pressure of solidarity in ethnic territories 
can lead to the capital remaining in a certain region, preventing gains from spreading to wider 
areas (Knudsen et al., 2013: 8). 
On the other hand, social capital, which bridges with top-level governance, must be effective 
in order not to cause social capital to have any exclusionary effects. At the same time, the social 
                                                        
5 Strong ties in homogeneous networks cause natural exclusion of non-network members. Because the principle of responsibility 
and reciprocity is an indispensable element to protect and limit resources (Hawkins and Maurer, 2012: 361). At this point, 
Waldinger (1995) states that ‘social relations among small groups have implicitly restricted outsiders, even though they increase 
productivity among themselves’ (Portes, 1998: 15). 
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capital between the state and society must have a complementary role. But when society is 
broken among conscious social groups, stronger groups will become dominant over the state, 
leading to the exclusion of other groups. Latin American countries are examples of this 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 237). Therefore, another situation in which it may be a 
potentially negative effect of the operation of social capital is that it may force compliance and 
social division in some communities. Putnam (2000) states that in the small towns of the 1950s 
America has given more importance to strong ties and less tolerance towards race and social 
diversity. At this point, Putnam observed that from the 1960s to the end of the 1990s, America 
had become a very tolerant country, but social capital had declined significantly in this period. 
Putnam notes that even though social capital is generally depressed in the US, more tolerant 
states tend to have higher levels of social capital (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002: 8). 
As a result, the benefits to be gained from social capital are limited due to the fact that social 
capital does not cover most of the society. At the same time, the social capital that emerges only 
as a result of relationships based on strong ties limits the vision of individuals and leads to 
discrimination and hostility among individuals. For this reason, in order to social capital to 
produce positive externalities, it is necessary to establish a precise balance between weak and 
strong ties. Therefore there is a need for inclusive politics in which the efforts of individuals 
are not sufficient and will be supported by the market and the state. 
1.3.1.2. Social Capital and Pressure-Interest Groups 
Social capital can lead to collective action failures due to the risks of unfavorable spread from 
social action and the in-group formation necessary to support unofficial collective action. Some 
activities of the oppression and pressure-interest groups that are formed in order to reach their 
own interests at this point it may cause social capital failure6 (Stern, 2013: 833, 834). The 
beneficiary activities of the pressure and interest groups may cause social capital failure. In 
particular, the implementation of social capital in the development process is not an impartial 
process. Better organized groups of society can run economic politics in their favor, and at the 
expense of other groups. At this point there is no guarantee that social capital will form a more 
just society (Grootaert, 1998: 9). 
Pressure and interest groups are part of democracy, and at the same time they help to represent 
a wide range of interests. However, many small organizations may have neither money nor 
members to provide any input. They can not defend their interests against wider and stronger 
groups without co-operation (Roskin et al., 2015: 223). The effects of pressure and interest 
groups on social capital can also emerge through associations. There are basically two ideas 
about associations. Putnam emphasizes that associations will create positive externalities for 
society, while Olson emphasizes that there are associations with negative externalities for 
society. Putnam-type associations, for example; organizations such as youth associations, 
sports and cultural associations may not have any goals or priorities such as lobbying in the 
redistribution process. On the other hand, Olson-type organizations, which consist of 
associations that bring together producers, professionals, workers and lobbyists, have the 
exclusionary effects of other groups at the point of redirecting resources in their redistribution 
process (Butter and Mosch, 2004: 11). 
In particular, network externalities may produce positive or negative effects in terms of 
economic growth. At this point, we should not forget the environmental impact. If we consider 
social capital as a public good in this sense, the problem of free-rider may arise. Better 
organizing pressure and interest groups can turn resources into their favor (Iyer, Kitson and 
Toh, 2005: 1017-1019). American economist Mancur Olson pointed out that small and well-
organized groups, especially those with money, generally outstrip the broader public interest 
in the Logic of Collective Action (1965) (Roskin et al., 2015: 225). At this point, Olson noted 
that some pressure and interest groups could prevent social economic progress by 
disproportionately sharing national resources or by hindering participation in wider social 
networks by putting heavy individual obligations on members. Some ethnic groups, especially 
                                                        
6 As Putnam points out, groups are an inevitable aspect of social life. When intra-group interests are dominant, negative 
consequences may arise if laws or norms are not sufficient to limit the actions of these groups. Groups generally prefer the interests 
of their group and embrace beliefs that strengthen their position (Stern, 2013: 833, 834). 
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those with some professions and industries, refuse to have commercial relations with traders 
from different ethnic origins, and new entrants are often excluded from strongly affiliated 
industrial groups (Rupasingha et al., 2000: 566, 567). 
On the other hand social capital acquired in a country with a centralized power can bring about 
negative outcomes rather than being positive in relation to economic growth. Because closed 
social networks represent anti-modern society, a society with organizational collapse and a 
deterioration of formal organizations. For example as a defense against the state, individuals 
can establish closed informal networks by contacting bureaucrats and breaking rules through 
bribery. At this point Rose (2000) argues that these networks constitute a formidable obstacle 
to former planned economies in Eastern Europe that want to change from anti-modern 
societies to well-functioning market economies. These informal pressure and interest groups 
seek to constitute special advantages for themselves as rent-seeking and the members trust 
each other specifically when they perform these unofficial and hidden activities which do not 
guarantee that resources are invested optimally in a society. Therefore closed networks will 
affect economic growth negatively in comparison with open networks (Graeff and Swendson, 
2012: 2833). 
As a result, when social capital can not be managed well and can not spread to the whole 
society, certain groups will benefit from social capital. Especially in the process of 
redistribution of public goods, the efforts of certain groups to return certain resources to them 
will lead to further deterioration of income distribution. At this point, when social capital is 
not well managed and is not a fair political and economic system, social capital can lead to 
power asymmetries, at the same time turn into the rent-seeking of the pressure and interest 
groups. For this reason, the social capital needs to be transformed into a structure covering the 
entire society. 
1.3.1.3. Social Capital and Crime 
In the case of negative externalities, too much social capital will be produced according to the 
social optimum. Uphoff describes as negative social capital. Sometimes misinformed values 
and social interactions can turn into a useful asset for social capital’s criminal organizations 
(Gootaert and Bastelaer, 2001: 7). The dark side of social capital is seen as an unknown area. 
Robert Putnam stated that even though social capital is generally good, it cause to criminal 
gangs due to negative co-operation. These characteristics of social capital can be explained by 
Alejandro Portes sociability as a sharp knife on both side (Field, 2008: 101,102). 
Especially bounded solidarity and trust may provide important resources for increasing the 
socio-economic structures and entrepreneurial characteristics of some groups, but may not 
produce positive characteristics for all (Portes, 1998: 18). In particular, the Italian Mafia can 
be described as a rather symbolic statement of the negative side of social capital. In an analysis 
of social capital and mafia, Sciarrone (2002) uses the phrase “Mafia is like a spider, making 
friendships, acquaintances, and networks of obligations”. At this point, the networks created 
by the mafia benefit from the power of weak ties (Andriani, 2013: 18). Although there is a high 
level of intra-group confidence in mafia-type organizations, it can be said that out-group trust 
is very low. The high level of private trust at this point increases the intra-group collaborative 
tendencies. Therefore the norms of conduct created by the Mafia do not apply outside of a small 
circle of mafia (Fukuyama, 1997: 379). 
On the other hand, Putnam notes that social capital has negative effects in some cases. Robert 
Putnam states that Oklahoma City bomber Timothy Mc Veigh, who is responsible for the 
terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, designed social tactics for bad purposes by designing 
tactics to be used in bombing while bowling (Field, 2008). The survey by Portes and Landolt 
(1996), on the other hand, states that poverty is an obstacle for social capital to create positive 
externalities, even though it is a significant binding social capital in the ghetto. In particular, 
the gangs in the ghetto create social networks that provide access and harmony to resources.7 
                                                        
7 A distinctive feature of America’s racialized urban core today is the dearth of core organizations necessary to contribute to  the 
community’s functioning and well-being. For the ghetto has experienced an accelerating process of organizational decline and 
involution induced not only by economic restructuring but also by state abandonment. At this point it can be argued that public 
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For a teenager living in a getto; membership in a gang can be the only way to obtain self-esteem 
and material property. However, in the long run, pressures from these groups could convince 
young people into groups and turn them into criminal habits (Morrow, 1999: 750).  
Especially since the early seventies, Chicago and other ghetto neighborhoods all over America 
have not only rapidly increased unemployment and poverty, but also a profound and 
widespread contraction of the public sector, due to the restructuring of central city economies. 
In particular, the lack of formal social capital in Ghetto prevents the accumulation and transfer 
of cultural capital to wider segments of society (Wacquant, 1998: 28-33). Another example of 
social capital failures is organized crime organizations in Latin America and Russia. Such 
criminal organizations can bring about great negative externalities in the rest of society in the 
form of lost lives, wasted resources and widespread uncertainty. The communitarian point of 
view also assumes that communities are homogeneous entities that automatically include and 
benefit all members. At the same time extensive literature on caste inequality, ethnic exclusion, 
and gender discrimination outcomes often produced and sustained by community pressures 
suggests otherwise (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 6). 
Social capital is one of the factors that affect the number of crime incidents in a society. It also 
plays an effective role in whether or not certain individuals will be succesful. This is not as 
simple as how the community and its members behave; social capital also affects the behavior 
of law enforcement bodies. The interest of social capital to law enforcement bodies is only due 
to the fact that networks of police and other institutions are strong and that the level of 
normative integration is higher and working more effectively in communities. This interest is 
a self-supporting process. It is much easier to establish and consolidate effective social ties in 
society where the crime rate is low, given the importance of the police, and where the public’s 
presumption of the police is mutually high. On the contrary, a sudden and sharp decline in 
social capital has resulted in a rise in alienation and anti-social behavior, especially among 
young men, as many of the UK’s coal mines have experienced since the 1980s national strike 
and the closure of the quarries (Field, 2008: 87).  
Therefore crime-related behaviors are not only related to the problems that arise from the 
individual’s own structure, but also to the behavior of peers or other people surrounding the 
individual. Therefore, in a society where an individual belongs, if his peers and the community 
to which he belongs penalize deviant behavior, the offense will tend to be less inclined to 
commit. In other words, informal social control increases the level of prosperity in a society. 
This increases the level of trust between citizens, self-sacrificing behaviors (such as charity and 
voluntary contributions or participation in donations), and participation in activities that serve 
the community at a more abstract level. At this point, unofficial social supervision will also 
reduce the suicidal tendency (Akçomak, 2008: 110). 
As a result, social capital has positive and negative aspects. Good social capital can facilitate 
collective action and encourage economic development. On the other hand, bad social capital 
can undermine co-operation and economic development. Mafia and gangs are examples of bad 
social capital. At this point, Levi, in some cases, shows that individualism has a more significant 
influence on the reduction of crime than social capital (Rupasingha et al., 2000: 566). 
1.3.1.4. Social Capital and Corruption 
The relationship between social capital and corruption is not entirely clear. As the level of social 
capital increases, the level of corruption may decrease or increase. This is due to the social 
capital’s own structure. Because corrupt actors creating their own social structure by specific 
norms and obligations facilitate the realization of their corrupt partners aims as well and they 
do so at the expense of people not involved in this kind of practices. Because social capital with 
positive outcomes for others and the ability to cooperate are difficult to measure, therefore the 
social capital concept is primarily conceptualized as social trust (Graeff and Swendsen, 2012: 
2830). 
                                                        
institutions operate as social capital failure that sustain ghetto residents in a marginal and dependent position (Wacquant, 1998: 
28, 29). 
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Trust may not always produce positive results in the name of social capital. Particularly in 
closed groups, individuals rely on each other. This form of trust occurs in closed networks that 
produce negative consequences for people outside the group. For example group members try 
to cover their illegal activities. At this point corruption may be labelled as bonding social capital 
with negative social outcomes or social capital failure. Norms of general cooperation are ruled 
out for corrupt actors as long as they act within their specific corrupt framework (Graeff and 
Swendsen, 2012: 2830, 2831). 
However, as the level of social capital increases, there may be instances where corruption has 
increased. Binding/bonding social capital can be used to explain this contradiction. An 
important feature of binding social capital is the strong reciprocal relationships among group 
members. About this subject, Harris (2007) analyzes the relationship between binding social 
capital and corruption. In closed groups where certain reciprocalities are high, perception of 
corruption is thought to be considered good reciprocity among peers. In this case, exclusionary 
nature of the binding social capital causes the moral cost to be low (Andriani, 2013: 9). In other 
words, only those who connect with close acquaintances, such as their own families and 
friends, are more likely to engage in corruption (Harris, 2007: 28). Collier and Garg (1999) 
argue that kinship groups have great advantages in creating binding social capital but they can 
pose a threat to the economy because they can promote corruption. After all, good for a small 
community may not be good for the general public (Akçomak, 2008: 30). 
Especially relations of strong family, kinship and close friendship cause adverse effect on 
corruption in terms of social capital. For instance cultural disturbances such as insecurity 
about strangers, the desire to protect and care for the closest ones, allow for the creation of 
corruption. Under these cultural conditions, for example, a politician who is elected to the 
public office feels himself obliged to direct public interest for himself and his relatives. Much 
of the political corruption crisis of Latin American countries was based on such a two-tier 
moral structure and significant gains have been achieved in establishing institutions to combat 
corruption in recent years, but will not be effective unless individual morality improves 
(Fukuyama, 2002: 28). 
As a result, it is not wrong to say that positive social capital is the best solution to corruption. 
Restructuring of social capital should be done simultaneously with institutional reforms. If 
institutions work efficiently, corruption becomes more difficult to come about. Institutional 
reforms need to be done with greater emphasis on people, not just on the structure or 
organization of the institutions. Therefore micro-behavioral analysis can be useful to discover 
other indirect mechanisms that can help prevent the malfunctioning of social capital and it is 
also important to establish generalized trust and reciprocity relationships among citizens, as 
well as to increase participation in citizen education and community work, and to encourage 
empathy for those who do not act well (Harris, 2007: 28, 29).  At the same time, centralized 
power will indirectly affect the degree of social capital via the quality of the economic 
institutions. Centralized power will increase the possibility of corruption, which reduces the 
quality of the economic institutions since existing economic rules will not be enforced 
impartially over time. Eventually, the degree of social capital will affect the size of the 
transaction costs and economic growth (Graeff and Swendson, 2012: 2833). 
1.3.1.5. Social Capital and Nepotism-Chronyism 
There is also an important relationship between social capital and nepotism (kin favoritism) 
and chronyism (co-friendly favoritism). In particular, the bonding social capital causes the 
opening of a network of relations based on nepotism and chronyism. Because bonding social 
capital is a double-edged sword. As Woolcock and Narayan (2000) state that  “ There are also 
costs in that these same ties can place considerable noneconomic claims on members” sense 
of obligation and commitment, with negative economic consequences. Group loyalties may be 
so strong that they isolate members from information about job opportunities, foster a climate 
of ridicule toward efforts to study and work hard (Wallis et al., 2003: 12). 
On the other hand Granovetter (1995) states that it is an instance of the problem that classic 
economic development theory identified among traditional enterprises. At this point Weber 
indicated that importance of impersonal economic transactions guided by the principle of 
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universalism as one of the major factors for Puritan entrepreneurial success. Especially cozy 
intergroup relations of the kind found in highly solidary communities may cause to great free-
rider problem, because less hardworking members enforce on the more successful all kinds of 
demands backed by a shared normative structure. For claimants, their social capital consists 
precisely of privileged access to the resources of fellow members. In the process, opportunities 
for entrepreneurial accumulation and success are dissipated. (Portes, 1998: 16). This situation 
demonstrates that the binding social capital has moved away from the principle of merit, 
because its commitment is increasing. 
There is also the effect of nepotism and chronyism in relation to social capital and political 
corruption. Especially in recent years, some countries, such as Argentina and Peru, have taken 
courageous steps to blame political leaders for the issue of corruption. Much of the research on 
anti-corruption deals with institutional solutions and administrative reforms. However, as 
mentioned earlier, there is an important cultural element in the prevention of corruption. At 
this point, the ethical corruption in the society is transformed into political corruption, and the 
political space becomes a vehicle for the rents of pressure and interest groups with networks 
of nepotical relations. To prevent nepotism and chronyism not only education, teaching, and 
reinforcement of norms, but also extensive cultural change are required (Fukuyama, 2002: 
35). Otherwise, social capital will cause negative externalities. 
As a result bonding/binding social capital can cause nepotism and chronyism. There is an 
intense sense of belonging and solidarity in groups with strong ties. The individuals within the 
same group are acting with a strong sense of reciprocity in their social and economic relations. 
At the same time nepotical and chronyic relations can be seen as legitimate. Because family 
and close friendship relations between the individuals are dominant. Such insights are 
spreading throughout the society in general. At this point, it is necessary to use cognitive social 
capital to reduce such negative effects of social capital. Cognitive perspective of social capital 
will provide social awareness on these issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Social capital can facilitate collective action and promote economic development by raising 
social awareness. On the other hand, when social capital is misused it may lead to the exclusion 
of groups of some individuals in the society and may lead to negative results in terms of 
economic development and income distribution. Therefore, there is no guarantee that social 
capital will create a better and fairer society. Particularly strong ties can preoccupy group 
affiliation, imprison individuals into their own groups, and hinder access to more distant 
groups. The exclusion of some groups sharpens the distinctions between groups and may 
reveal new hostilities in society in the process of redistribution. At the same time misplaced 
values and social interactions can turn into useful forms for criminal organizations. A behavior 
that is favorable by a small segment of society may not be good for the general population. At 
this point, relations formed with both strong ties and weak ties are required.  
Especially in countries where the state is non-accountable and non-transparent, pressure and 
interest groups can transfer resources to their groups in the redistribution process. For this 
reason, social capital needs to cover a large part of society. At this point, the quality and 
heterogeneity are as important as the number of groups. In particular, the overlapping and 
interaction of different networks with each other will also prevent social division. At the same 
time, it is necessary for individuals to establish a delicate balance between weak and strong ties 
so that social capital can create positive externalities. It will be difficult for social morality and 
awareness to emerge without individual morality and awareness. In countries where there is 
non-accountable and non-transparent state of law and where property rights can not be 
protected, the ineffectiveness of the state can lead to the creation of privileged classes, which 
can lead to the failure of social capital. It must be utilized simultaneously from both the 
bonding and the bridging social capital. In this way it will be limited the negative externalities 
of social capital. 
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